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Colonial Institutions, Trade Shocks, and 
the Diffusion of Elementary Education in 
Brazil, 1889–1930 

ALDO MUSACCHIO, ANDRÉ MARTÍNEZ FRITSCHER, AND 
MARTINA VIARENGO
We study the initial expansion of public schooling across Brazilian states 
(1889–1930) and develop an alternative explanation of how colonial institutions 
may affect the provision of public goods in the long run. We find that states that 
exported commodities undergoing international booms, between 1889 and 1930, 
had significantly larger export tax revenues and could spend more on education, 
while other states lagged behind. Yet, such positive effect of commodity booms 
on education expenditures was muted in states that either had more slaves before 
abolition or cultivated cotton during colonial times. 
ecent research links current levels of development in former 
colonies, and even across regions in former colonies, to colonial 
institutions (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2001, pp. 44–45; Engerman and Sokoloff 2002; Nunn 2008; 
Bruhn and Gallego 2012) According to this literature, conditions and 
endowments at the time of colonization determined political institutions 
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that created and then perpetuated an unequal distribution of land, 
wealth, and political power. Most of these papers then present 
cross-sectional regressions showing how initial colonial institutions 
are correlated with per capita expenditures on public goods such 
as education, both across (Engerman,Mariscal, and Sokoloff 2009; 
Gallego 2010; Frankema 2012) and within countries (Banerjee and Iyer 
2005; Wegenast 2009, 2010; Iyer 2010; Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno, and 
Robinson 2012).
 Yet, correlations between variables observed hundreds of years 
apart demand further examination. As a matter of fact, we know 
that there have been significant reversals of fortune among former 
colonies in terms of economic prosperity (Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2002), legal institutions (Musacchio 2008), and financial 
development (Rajan and Zingales 2003; Musacchio 2010). We also 
know that trade shocks in the nineteenth century increased inequality 
in the Americas (Coatsworth 2005, 2008; Williamson 2009; Arroyo-
Abad 2013). Thus, it is worth examining whether colonial institutions 
determine outcomes that then persist for hundreds of years or 
if institutional changes or trade shocks interact with those initial 
institutions to alter the development trajectories of national or 
subnational units in the long run.
 In this article, we study the effect that colonial institutions and 
subsequent changes in fiscal institutions had on educational outcomes 
in Brazilian states. Rather than correlating some variables in the 
past with today’s outcomes, we document how the variation in export 
tax revenues in Brazilian states between 1889 and 1930, and their 
interaction with colonial institutions, explain which states spent on 
education and forged ahead, and which states lagged behind in the 
education rankings. This exercise is relevant because if we were looking 
only at the path-dependent effects of colonial institutions on education 
indicators at the end of the twentieth century, we would miss much of 
the radical changes and reversals that we find in the ranking of Brazilian 
states according to educational outcomes between 1872 and 1940. 
That is, many of the states that had low literacy rates throughout the 
nineteenth century ended up in the leading positions by 1940, while 
states that were among the most educated states in 1872 ended up at the 
bottom of the ranking in 1940 (see Table 1). Something changed, and it 
was not the colonial past.
 We take advantage of the fact that Brazil had a peculiar federal 
arrangement during its First Republic, 1889–1930. During this period, 
the Constitution decentralized fiscal responsibilities and the right 
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TABLE 1 
RANKING OF STATES BY LITERACY RATES IN THE LONG RUN
Panel A. Ranking of States by Literacy Ratesa









States that moved up the ranking over time 
São Paulo 18.8 10 16.6 10 52.1 2 95.4 3
Santa Catarina 16.5 11 23.3 3 49.1 3 95.6 2
Goiás 16.2 12 12.6 16 22.8 16 91.2 8
Amazonas 14.1 15 19.0 6 36.6 9 92.0 6
Espírito Santo 13.1 17 16.0 13 39.8 8 91.5 7
Minas Gerais 11.2 20 12.2 17 33.0 10 91.1 9
Rio de Janeiro 19.1 9 17.8 8 42.5 5 95.7 1
States that did not move significantly from their ranking in 1872b 
Paraná 28.9 1 22.5 4 42.9 4 93.4 5
Rio Grande do Sul 22.5 3 30.3 1 54.4 1 95.0 4
Sergipe 13.4 16 11.6 19 27.2 11 83.2 12
Ceará 13.0 18 16.3 11 26.2 13 80.8 15
Paraíba 12.9 19 14.9 15 20.8 18 76.5 18
States that moved down the ranking over time 
Pará 26.7 2 26.0 2 41.1 6 88.3 11 
Maranhão 22.1 4 15.4 14 21.2 17 78.5 17 
Mato Grosso 20.5 5 19.4 5 40.5 7 89.9 10 
Bahia 20.3 6 10.1 20 23.7 15 81.5 13 
Pernambuco 19.6 7 16.8 9 25.1 14 81.5 14 
Rio Grande do Norte 19.1 8 18.3 7 27.1 12 80.4 16 
Piauí 15.0 13 11.8 18 19.0 20 76.5 19 
Alagoas 14.3 14 16.2 12 19.5 19 74.8 20 
Brazil 18.5 19.2 40.5 89.9 
Panel B. Correlation of Literacy Rates by Statec
1872 1890 1900 1920 1940 1950 1970 1980 1991 
1890 0.82* 1 
1900 0.67* 0.87*      1 
1920 0.74* 0.91* 0.93* 1 
1940 0.66* 0.84* 0.86* 0.97* 1 
1950 0.60* 0.79* 0.80* 0.94* 0.99* 1 
1970 0.40 0.55* 0.65* 0.78* 0.88* 0.91* 1 
1980 0.40 0.54 0.64* 0.77* 0.86* 0.90* 0.99* 1 
1991 0.35 0.48 0.61* 0.74* 0.83* 0.87* 0.98* 0.99* 1 
2007 0.33 0.47 0.65* 0.74* 0.82* 0.85* 0.97* 0.98* 0.98* 
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TABLE 1 — continued 
* denotes significance at 1 percent.  
Notes: a) Literacy rates are calculated as the number of literates over the population 4 years and 
older, except for 1940 when we have to divide it by the population 5 years and older. b) This 
group shows states that did not move more than five places in the overall ranking between 1872 
and 2007. c) These correlations include all states except the Federal District. 
to tax exports. Thus, we show how the change in fiscal institutions in 
1889 triggered changes in the development trajectories of states. We use 
the variation in fiscal revenues across states and over time to explain the 
variation in education expenditures at the state level. As the majority of 
revenues came from export taxes, states that exported commodities that 
had price ramp-ups could collect more revenues per capita and could—
if they chose—spend more on education. 
 Using both ordinary least square and instrumental variable techniques 
and controlling for a series of macro variables, fixed effects, year 
dummies, and state-specific linear trends, we find that changes in export 
prices and export tax revenues are positively correlated with education 
expenditures per capita and with education outcomes such as literacy 
and the number of schools. We then show how institutions, such as the 
extent to which slavery prevailed in each state by the 1860s, attenuated 
some of the positive effects of export tax revenue windfalls. The basic 
idea is that there are conditions that may come from the initial colonial 
settling and exploitation patterns (for example, the prevalence of slavery 
or the type of agricultural systems used) that led, in turn, to the creation 
of specific political institutions that, in turn, determined how much 
provincial elites and politicians wanted to invest in mass education. 
After adding a series of interactive effects between export tax revenues 
and different dummy variables that try to capture which states had more 
extractive colonial institutions, we find that in states in which slavery 
was stronger right before abolition (1888) and states that had the 
most exploitative cotton plantation systems at the end of the colonial 
era, increases in export tax revenues between 1889 and 1930 were
not translated into more expenditures in education.  
 The shocks we document are not only statistically significant but also 
relevant in economic terms. During the period, we study Brazil as a 
whole had the largest increase in literacy rates in Latin America, going 
from 19.8 percent in 1890 to 40.5 percent in 1940 for the population 
over the age of four. However, this improvement in literacy rates 
was uneven across states, with states such as São Paulo improving 
literacy from 18.8 percent to 52.1 percent of the population and 
others such as Maranhão, Mato Grosso, or Bahia keeping literacy rates 
at 20 percent throughout the period we study. 
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 Our findings contribute to a growing literature on the long-term 
effects of colonial institutions in Brazil. Joana Naritomi, Rodrigo R. 
Soares, and Julian J. Assunção (2012) find that municipalities that 
exported mining products or sugar during colonial times tend to have 
worse current indicators of rule of law and legal sophistication. 
Tim Wegenast (2010) shows in a cross-sectional framework that, at the 
state level, land inequality, which supposedly persists from colonial 
times, is correlated with educational attainment. In contrast, William R. 
Summerhill (2010) finds no long-term correlation between colonial 
institutions and land inequality or GDP per capita among municipalities 
in São Paulo. Similarly, Irineu de Carvalho Filho and Renato P. 
Colistete (2010) find strong correlation between education levels at 
the municipal level in São Paulo around 1905 and today; but do not 
attribute education levels today to colonial institutions. 
 Below we first review the rapid expansion in the provision of public 
education by the states of the Brazilian Federation between 1889 and 
1930. We then examine the determinants of expenditures on schooling, 
presenting statistical evidence showing the relation between export tax 
revenue and expenditures on education. We end with a discussion of our 
results and of possible alternative explanations. 
THE DIFFUSION OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION IN BRAZIL, 1890–1930
 We focus our attention on the period that goes from 1889 to 1930 
because before that the political and fiscal institutions of Brazil 
held back the expansion of mass schooling. On the one hand, after 
independence in 1821 Brazilian politicians chose a political system that 
perpetuated the elitist nature of the political institutions imposed by the 
Portuguese during colonial times. For instance, in the 1824 Constitution 
Brazil’s founding fathers adopted a constitutional monarchy with a 
clear division of power, an elected parliament, and an emperor, but they 
restricted the right to vote by imposing an income requirement that 
ranged between 100 and 200 times the annual income of most skilled 
workers. Moreover, elections were indirect, with parliamentarians 
(senators and deputies) elected by state electoral colleges.1
1 Voters in parishes (known as eleitores) voted to elect an electoral college similar to that G
of the United States. The members of this electoral college were known as votantes (voters).
The Constitution of 1824 included income requirements for both eleitores and votantes. For the 
former it was approximately US $60, while the latter needed to prove an income of $120. G
This requirement allowed professionals to vote, but restricted the vote for most workers and G
day laborers. There were exceptions to this requirement, mostly for members of the army. G
See Porto (2002), especially pp. 44–45. Law 3029 of January 9, 1881 increased the income 
requirement for voters to $120.  
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 On the other hand, even if elites across states in Brazil wanted 
to spend on education, the resources state coffers had were limited. 
This is because even though the 1824 Constitution decentralized the 
provision of education, the collection of revenues, mostly coming 
from foreign trade, was highly centralized during the Imperial period 
(1821–1889) (Hilsdorf 2003). The central government actually spent 
disproportionately on public goods that benefited the capital city of Rio 
de Janeiro or the armed forces (Villela 2005, 2007).  
 Under such a political system, whatever resources provincial elites 
spent on public elementary education went to pay for schools that 
educated mostly their own children or those of other elites. As a sign of 
how elitist the system was, consider the following data. Enrollment 
rates during the Imperial period stayed below 10 percent. The privileged 
children who attended school in Brazil during that time benefited 
from public expenditures per enrolled student that were as high as the 
expenditures per children of school age observed in European countries 
at the time (Chaudhary et al. 2012). 
 By the end of the Imperial period, the low penetration of public 
education had left its mark in Brazil. Using data from the 1890 Census, 
we know that Brazil had one of the lowest literacy rates in the Americas 
(16.6 percent). In fact, some Brazilian states had literacy rates of 10.1 
percent. Furthermore, there were two schools for every 1,000 school-
age children in the country and in some states, such as Bahia and Ceará, 
there was only one school per 1,000 children.
 In 1879 Leôncio de Carvalho, Minister for Internal Affairs, sent 
Congress a bill that introduced secular education and mandated the 
creation of schools of education to train teachers. Despite these 
reforms, there was no significant change in school infrastructure, 
the number of teachers, and the curriculum in the provinces until 
after the Republican parties took over in 1889.
 Things changed rapidly after 1889 when a Republican revolution 
overthrew the monarchy and heralded positivism. One of the central 
tenants of positivism in Brazil was the idea that to become a civilized 
nation, the government had to provide secular education on a massive 
scale. Thus, the Republicans drafted a new constitution in 1891, 
significantly reforming the way schooling was financed and organized.
 The 1891 constitution decentralized the collection of export taxes 
and the responsibility of providing public goods such as education, 
health care, and infrastructure. Because the constitution did not 
include any mechanism by which the federal government would 
aid poor states, other than some subsidies for ports and railroads, 
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TABLE 2
STATE EXPENDITURES ON EDUCATION AND OUTCOMES BY COMMODITY EXPORTED































High expenditures on  
education        
Amazonas Rubber Cacao 1.8 12 3.2 9 
Ceará Cattle Cotton 0.4 23 0.7 19 
Espírito Santo Coffee Sugar 1.2 22 1.0 9 
Mato Grosso Rubber Cattle 0.9 23 1.7 12 
Minas Gerais Coffee Mining 0.4 28 2.4 15 
Pará Rubber Cacao 2.4 25 2.1 11 
Paraná Mate Mining 0.9 20 1.4 14 
Rio de Janeiro Coffee Sugar 1.6 19 1.2 11 
Rio Grande do Sul Cattle Cattle 1.1 19 1.8 15 
Santa Catarina Mate Cattle 0.6 27 0.8 13 
São Paulo Coffee Indian slaves 0.7 14 3.6 16 
Low expenditures on  
education        
Alagoas Sugar Sugar 0.5 19 0.5 13 
Bahia Tobacco Sugar 0.5 15 0.4 6 
Goiás na Mining 0.4 21 0.2 8 
Maranhão Cotton Cotton 0.9 32 0.5 10 
Paraíba Cotton Sugar 0.4 18 0.5 12 
Pernambuco Sugar Sugar 1.0 20 0.5 7 
Piauí Cotton Sugar 0.3 16 0.2 9 
Rio Grande do Norte Cotton Cattle 0.5 27 0.5 9 
Sergipe Sugar Sugar 0.7 19 0.9 14 
Brazil     0.7 19 1.2 17 
expenditures on education were limited to the funds states could 
generate from their own export and internal taxes. This boosted state 
coffers in states that exported commodities in high demand, such as 
rubber and coffee, and kept stable the public finances of states that 
exported commodities that did not have price increases such as sugar 
and tobacco. Table 2 shows that, from the empire to the Republic, 
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High expenditures on  
education        
Amazonas 26 5 10.0 23.2 3.4 8.9 
Ceará 28 5 4.2 13.0 1.0 1.8 
Espírito Santo 17 20 7.2 25.2 2.9 4.4 
Mato Grosso 26 10 7.9 22.8 2.2 3.3 
Minas Gerais 47 12 5.7 23.4 2.1 2.1 
Pará 26 13 13.5 27.9 3.8 4.2 
Paraná 18 17 10.2 25.2 3.1 3.8 
Rio de Janeiro 32 29 14.4 29.1 3.9 3.4 
Rio Grande do Sul 19 10 9.8 33.2 2.0 5.7 
Santa Catarina 18 10 10.0 37.3 2.3 6.4 
São Paulo 28 10 6.3 31.6 3.1 3.2 
Low expenditures on  
education        
Alagoas 53 15 5.4 13.2 1.6 2.2 
Bahia 22 23 4.4 9.2 1.3 1.7 
Goiás 44 23 4.4 12.1 1.6 2.1 
Maranhão 81 20 5.7 12.2 1.5 2.3 
Paraíba 14 8 2.0 16.0 0.7 2.2 
Pernambuco 20 31 7.5 15.7 2.9 3.0 
Piauí 14 11 2.9 8.0 1.1 0.9 
Rio Grande do Norte 13 10 7.7 20.6 2.3 2.5 
Sergipe 22 32 4.9 17.4 2.7 3.5 
Brazil 27 12 7.0 23.3 2.2 3.0 
Sources: See the Appendix. 
real per capita expenditures on education increased 71 percent, on 
average, but declined in states that exported sugar and tobacco. Also in 
Table 2, we can see that the states with higher average expenditures on 
education per capita, higher enrollment rates, and more schools per 
capita between 1889 and 1930 were those that exported rubber, coffee, 
and cattle. States that exported coffee and rubber, for instance, outspent 
sugar-exporting states 2.5 times and cotton-exporting states 3.5 times. 
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 With the change in ideology and the new revenues, state governments 
promoted a gradual and uneven transformation in elementary education 
in Brazil. They began a shift from the Lancaster method, in which 
students of all ages studied together in one room and helped each 
other learn with the guidance of one teacher, to a system that separated 
students according to grades and scheduled one subject at a time. These 
changes required more teachers and also more buildings, not only for 
the separate grades but also for facilities such as gyms and libraries. 
Some schools in large cities adapted more rapidly to such changes and 
introduced a new school layout and schedule, but schools in the interior 
were slower or never adopted such changes (De Souza 1998).  
 The transition to the Republic also brought about changes in the 
incentives of politicians and state parties to spend on education. The 
Constitution of 1891 introduced direct elections for governor, for local 
assemblies, and for representatives to the Senate and National Congress. 
Thus, improving education became a political prerogative, not only 
because voters could demand education, but because due to the literacy 
requirement to vote, increasing literacy could help local political bosses 
to mobilize more voters in state and national elections. At the national 
level, the introduction of direct elections changed the way local parties 
negotiated favors with the ruling national coalition. National parties 
no longer negotiated coalitions with state parties on the basis of 
electoral college votes, but rather on the basis of the total votes the state 
parties could deliver in national elections. The kind of favors state 
parties negotiated included subsidies for railways and port projects, and 
political support against opposition candidates.2
 All of those positive incentives and new ideologies led politicians to 
invest in public education at the state level, specifically on elementary 
education. School enrollment, teacher-pupil ratios, and the number 
of schools per children enrolled improved significantly between 1889 
and 1930. Enrollment rates in elementary school, defined as the ratio of 
2 These exchanges of favors were formalized in 1902 by President Manuel Ferraz de Campos 
Sales. According to this agreement, a state party could appeal to the president and the ruling 
coalition in Congress for help if an opposition state party threatened its hold on power. Since 
contested elections for governors or for federal senators and congressmen had to be scrutinized 
by the national Congress, the ruling coalition could help a state party to annul the election of G
an opposition candidate on some technical ground. This practice was commonly referred to G
as “beheading.” See Porto (2002, p. 196) and Fausto (1999 pp. 258–59). For some examples G
of beheading, see the vote count in the Diario do Congresso on June 27, 1902. Moreover, the 
federal government intervened regularly in states where the local party in power opposed the 
ruling federal coalition. Thus, state politicians another bargaining chip between national and 
state parties were ways to avoid federal government intervention. Such interventions occurred G
in Paraná, Pernambuco, and Santa Catarina in the 1890s, in Pernambuco in 1908–1915, and in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1923. For a discussion of some of these electoral conflicts, see De Souza 
(1969).
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the number of students enrolled to the population of children from 
5 to 14 years old, went from 6 percent in 1889 to 23 percent in 1933 
(Table 2). These improvements were mostly due to improvements in 
the public provision of elementary education. In fact, the advance of 
state-sponsored schools was such that they gained market share from 
private and municipal schools; increasing their share of total enrollment 
from 53 percent to 65 percent between 1907 and 1933, while private, 
municipal, and the few federal schools lost ground proportionally. 
 With enrollment rates increasing at over 700 percent between 
1889 and 1930, we would expect teacher-pupil ratios to have fallen. 
Yet, even with the rapid increase in enrollment, teacher-pupil ratios 
in state schools went down from 43 in 1889 to 40 in 1933. This was a 
consequence of the efforts to train and recruit teachers. Both national 
and state governments built new education schools, known as Normal 
Schools, and recruited their graduates en masse, paying them a higher 
salary than what teachers without a degree earned. Teachers without a 
degree were also hired in large numbers, but they had to pass an exam 
and were paid according to experience and training.3
 Thanks to cohort data from the 1960 Census, we know that some of 
these changes in the education system between 1889 and 1930 actually 
improved outcomes. Table 3 shows the literacy and attendance rates 
for children who were 6 to 10 years old in 1910, 1920, and 1930. 
While in the 1890 Census the literacy rate in Brazil was 19.2 percent, 
those children who attended school circa 1910 had a literacy rate of 
44.8 percent. Moreover, the cohort that studied elementary education in 
the late 1920s (see the third column of Table 3) had a literacy rate of 
56.2 percent according to the 1960 Census. 
 Yet there is a significant difference in the educational attainment 
of blacks and mixed-race Brazilians compared to whites. Literacy 
rates among white Brazilians who attended school during our period 
were close to 60 percent. In contrast, among black Brazilians the 
literacy rate was 33.1 percent according to cohort data from the 1960 
Census. We think the poor improvement in education outcomes among 
blacks is to a large extent due to the fact that the percentage 
3 Just to give an idea of how the supply of teachers changed after 1890, in the state of G
São Paulo, the Central Normal School (the Central School of Education) operated on and G
off between 1846 and 1880 and, thus, trained only 315 new teachers. Between 1890 and 1921, 
10,508 teachers graduated from 11 such teaching schools in the same state. State schools also 
hired teachers without diplomas through a “concurso” (contest) in which teachers competed for 
jobs by taking exams and being interviewed. See Da Costa (1983, pp. 109–12). For further 
discussion of the Normal Schools and the recruitment of teachers, see De Souza (1998); Moacyr 
(1939); and reports from the ministers of education of states. 
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TABLE 3
EDUCATION OUTCOMES USING CENSUS DATA FROM 1960
  Population 6–10 years old in: 
  1910 1920 1930 
Literacy rate (%) 44.8 51.5 56.2 
Whites 55.3 62.0 67.0 
Blacks 21.7 27.6 33.1 
Mixed race 26.8 33.5 37.7 
Completed elementary education (% of cohort) 2.5 3.2 3.5 
Whites 3.6 4.5 5.1 
Blacks 0.2 0.4 0.5 
Mixed race 0.5 0.6 0.9 
Completed up to fourth grade 10.3 11.8 13.2 
Whites 14.1 15.7 17.3 
Blacks 3.3 4.2 5.8 
Mixed race 3.3 4.6 5.5 
Never attended school (% cohort) 59.9 53.1 48.1 
Whites 49.8 42.6 37.3 
Blacks 81.4 75.7 70.2 
Mixed race 77.2 71.1 66.5 
Note: Part of the differences between whites and mixed race Brazilians and blacks could be 
driven by survival bias. Yet for it to be a problem, literate blacks would have to have had a 
lower mortality rate than other black Brazilians. 
Source: Brazil, VII Recenseamento Geral do Brasil, IBGE, 1960. 
of blacks who never attended school in the 1910 cohort was 81.4 
percent and in the 1930 cohort it was 70.2 percent (see Table 3). 
 That is, during the period we study, the number of public schools 
and teachers grew rapidly, but the expansion of elementary education 
benefited mostly the white and mixed race elites. Despite the 
enthusiasm of the Republican elites for expanding public schooling and 
reducing illiteracy, the expansion of public education did not grow in 
all the states at the same rates. As we elaborate below, states in which 
the percentage of slaves to total population had been large during the 
empire saw less improvement in education outcomes after 1889. 
EXPLAINING THE VARIATION IN EXPENDITURES ON EDUCATION
 The period 1889–1930 had rapid increases in the number of schools, 
teachers, and students. This expansion required resources and not all 
states were able to collect the same level of revenues to pay for public 
schools. Thus, in this section we explain how the variation in export tax 
revenues explains increases in education spending at the state level. 
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 To document the drivers of education expenditures, we created 
a panel with state-level data on expenditures, export tax revenues, 
population density, and imports per capita between 1890 and 1930 
(the Appendix explains our data sources and methodology). The panel 
is unbalanced for expenditure, revenue, and education data. We have a 
complete panel with data on state’s export prices and volumes exported 
between 1901 and 1930. However, we have expenditure and revenue 
data for only three periods: 1901–1907, 1914–1919, and 1923–1925.
 We start by running a simple OLS regression using our panel and 
a baseline specification for examining the determinants of per capita 
expenditures on education of the following form: 
eeit =  sit + Xit + i+t +it 
 
where eeit is the log of expenditures on education per capita (or per 
child of school age, 5–14) in state i in year t and sit is the log of export 
tax revenue per capita for state i in year t. We also include a vector 
of state characteristics, X, which includes population density and debt 
per capita.4 We use the natural logarithms of the variables to minimize 
the effect of outliers and to ensure that most variables follow a normal 
distribution. While all regressions include year dummies (t) to account 
for time-varying trends common to all states, we run regressions with 
and without state-fixed effects (i) and state-specific, linear trends.
 The main coefficient , then, should be interpreted as an (export) 
income elasticity for state governments that tells us, in percentage 
points, how much education spending would increase given a 1 percent 
increase in export tax revenue. Our OLS estimates in Table 4 show that 
a 1 percent increase in export tax revenues is correlated with a 0.11 to 
0.27 percent increase in education expenditures. If a state’s export tax 
revenues per capita jumped 100 percent in one year, which indeed took 
place in states that exported rubber or cotton, education expenditures 
per capita could go up by over 20 percent. This is a large and significant 
effect. In fact, the “elasticity of income” for education expenditures 
is higher than the elasticity of income of other normal public
4 We include debt per capita as an independent variable to control for the actual size of the 
budget constraint in each state. We include population density because we think it is a good 
proxy for the growth in urbanization and income per capita and as such it should help us control 
for factors that drive the demand for education. For instance, ideally we would want to control 
for GDP per capita at the state level. One can imagine that the average family, as it got richer, 
was in a better position to send kids to school. Yet, there is no annual GDP data at the state level 
that can be used in a panel setting. 
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TABLE 4
OLS REGRESSIONS WITH EXPENDITURES ON EDUCATION PER CAPITA AT THE 
STATE LEVEL, 1901–1926
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. Variable: Log of Expenditures on Education per Capita 
 



























rev pc) 0.324*** 0.326*** 0.286*** 0.107* 0.296*** 0.153*** 0.285*** 0.111* 
(0.100) (0.100) (0.075) (0.056) (0.078) (0.048) (0.072) (0.057) 
ln(popdensity) 0.665 1.011 7.475 1.140 1.164 0.975 8.311 
(0.831) (0.622) (6.704) (0.746) (0.706) (0.609) (6.878) 
ln(state debt 
per capita) 0.001 –0.029 –0.095 –0.025 –0.036 –0.030 –0.090 





trends N N N Y N N N Y 
Crop mix N N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 292 285 255 255 214 228 255 255 
Number of  
states 21 20 18 18 16 17 18 18 
R2 overall 0.34 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.01 
R2 between 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.02 
R2 within 0.25 0.27 0.43 0.65 0.49 0.34 0.45 0.64 
* denote statistical significance at 10 percent. 
** denote statistical significance at 5 percent. 
*** denote statistical significance at 1 percent. 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Errors clustered are at the state level.  
All regressions include a constant. The sample includes only 18 states once we control for the 
export crop mix because we exclude the landlocked state of Goias and the capital of the country, 
the port of Rio de Janeiro, which had import duties as an additional source of revenue. 
goods such as healthcare.5 Moreover, even when we control for the 
composition of the export basket, we find that the coefficient for export 
5 We compare the elasticities for healthcare and education expenditures using panel data G
from 1901 to 1908—for which we have complete expenditures on both items, including 
state- and year-fixed effects—and controlling for imports per capita and population 
density. The elasticities for healthcare and education expenditures are 0.026 and 0.11, 
respectively. We conducted a t-test to check if the elasticity for healthcare expenditures is bigger 
than that for education and reject this hypothesis with 99 percent confidence. 
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revenues per capita is still significant and of similar magnitude. That 
means that it was not changes in the composition of exports that 
determined the increase in revenues and expenditures, but either 
increases in export prices or changes in the capacity to export greater 
volume.  
 There is, however, a possible problem of using OLS with fixed 
effects to study how changes in export tax revenues affect education 
spending. Running OLS may confound the effect of, say, a commodity 
price increase with state-specific trends that may have begun before our 
period. There might even be state-specific trends that are correlated 
with commodity price increases but not caused by them. Therefore, 
in specifications 4 and 9 of Table 4, we run OLS specifications 
that include state-specific, linear time trends in addition to the fixed 
effects and time dummies we had in previous specifications. In these 
specifications, we find that export tax revenues still explain increases 
in education expenditures, and even if the coefficient is smaller 
(closer to 0.10), it is statistically significant at almost 5 percent.  
 In specifications 7 and 8, we run the baseline model with and without 
state-specific trends, using expenditure on education per child as 
the dependent variable. We find results that are consistent with 
our estimates using expenditures per capita. We prefer to rely on the per 
capita expenditures data because, in order to estimate expenditures per 
child, we have to make assumptions about the trend of the population 
pyramids between census years. Moreover, since some of the education 
was also for adults, expenditures per child may not be the proper way to 
think about education spending during this period. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 One concern with our estimates is how exogenous the variation in 
export tax revenues is. For instance, if Brazilian states could control the 
prices of the commodities they exported, then it would be hard to argue 
export tax revenue is exogenous to the political economy of each state. 
This is particularly a concern for states that were large coffee and 
rubber exporters. Brazil was the world’s largest exporter of those two 
commodities in the period we study and there were efforts on the 
part of the national and state governments to control international 
coffee prices in different moments in time. The states of São Paulo, 
Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro, as price setters in the international 
coffee market, largely determined the growth rate of national coffee 
exports (especially in 1905–1914 and in some years in the 1920s).  
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 Amazonas and Pará were the principal suppliers in the international 
rubber market, but their governments did not coordinate to control 
prices. Thus, in specification 5 of Table 4, we omit the coffee-exporting 
states, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo from the estimates. In this 
specification, the coefficient of export tax revenue is unchanged. Then, 
in specification 6 we omit the rubber-exporting states, Amazonas 
and Pará from the sample and the coefficient for the log of export tax 
revenues goes to 0.15, but remains statistically significant at 1 percent.
 There are two additional concerns related to the exogeneity of our 
variable of interest. The first concern is whether the variation in export 
tax revenues is attributable to exogenous conditions in commodity 
markets, especially to changes in prices. The second concern is whether 
the variation in export tax revenues are a product of changes in tax 
rates rather than prices (since tax rates can be endogenous to political 
outcomes and to changes in prices).6
 To check the connection between export prices and expenditures 
on education, we created a series of export price indices (one per state) 
and used them as instruments for export tax revenues. We focus on 
international prices because we wanted an instrument that could capture 
both supply and demand conditions. During our period, most of the 
shocks to commodity prices were demand-driven, rather than created 
by, say, a drought or a bad harvest that reduced the supply.7
 In the first stage, we use these indices as an instrument for export tax 
revenue per capita, assuming that our export price indices per state will 
reflect how much state governments could extract in export taxes. Since 
export taxes were ad valorem, increases in export values were translated 
into higher tax revenues. In the second stage, we use our estimated state 
export tax revenues per capita as an independent variable to estimate the 
coefficient of the elasticity of export tax revenue to per capita education 
spending.
6 Serial correlation could also be a concern that justifies the use of instrumental variables. G
Yet, we conducted appropriate tests and found that once we clustered errors at the state level G
(as we did in all of our estimates), there is no serial correlation in the errors that we should be 
concerned about. 
7 We created an export price index for each state, which includes the eight largest export 
commodities. We use world market prices for commodities, which we obtain from Global 
Financial Data or from the database of Jacks, O’Rourke, and Williamson (2009), and we then 
weight those prices using the 1901 export basket, the earliest observation we have of the export 
mix. We do this exercise for each state. We use fixed weights because one can imagine that the 
export mix might be endogenous to changes in expenditures in public goods and we want the 
export mix to be as exogenous as possible to expenditures on education and other public goods. 
In any case, the results do not change much if we use the export basket in each year to weight 
prices 
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TABLE 5
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES REGRESSIONS FOR EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION
  Dependent Variable is the Log Education  











(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Second Stage (IV: export price index per state)
Log (Export tax revenue pc) 0.484*** 0.355*** 0.372*** 0.492* 
(0.092) (0.098) (0.092) (0.251) 
Log (non-export tax revenue) 0.207*** 0.149*** 0.253*** 0.175*** 
(0.057) (0.053) (0.063) (0.064) 
Observations 270 255 214 240 
R2 adjusted 0.877 0.904 0.901 0.88 
Anderson canonical correlations LR  
statistic 46.6*** 38.2*** 40.34*** 8.89** 
First stage: 
Log (Export prices) –9.42*** 0.684*** 0.784*** 0.341* 
(1.609) (0.164) (0.175) (0.165) 
R2 adjusted 0.81  0.83  0.82  0.81  
F-statistic 23.79*** 17.42*** 20.00*** 4.25** 
OLS Coefficients: 
Log (Export tax revenue pc) 0.326*** 0.286*** 0.296*** 0.153*** 
(0.100) (0.075) (0.078) (0.048) 
Fixed effects and year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Population density and debt per capita Y Y Y Y 
Commodity mix (exports) N Y Y Y 
* indicates significance at 10 percent. 
** indicates significance at 5 percent. 
*** indicates significance at 1 percent. 
Note: Our instruments are a set of export price indices, one per state. We created an export price 
index for each state using the prices of the eight largest exports and leaving the weights fixed 
for the entire period (we use weights for 1900). Robust state cluster standard errors are shown in 
parenthesis. 
 Table 5 shows the results of our instrumental variables (IV) estimates. 
The state-level variation in export prices seems to explain the variation 
in education spending over time quite strongly. We find strong and 
significant coefficients in the first and second stages. This might imply 
that what did the most to increase revenues and expenditures was
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the price ramp-ups and not, for instance, tax increases or changes in the 
export mix. In specification 2, we include a control for export shares, 
which should capture the dynamics of the export mix as a reaction 
to changes in prices. The coefficient of our instrumented export 
tax revenue per capita remains strong and significant, with an elasticity 
of 0.355, which is above all of our OLS estimates in Table 4.  
 Using price indices of commodity exports as instruments for 
export tax revenues (in Table 5), however, assumes that states did not 
themselves influence the growth rate of prices in international markets. 
To deal with the potential endogeneity in coffee and rubber prices, 
specifications 3 and 4 of Table 5 exclude coffee and rubber states, 
respectively. When we exclude coffee states, the results do not change, 
which is a comforting result given the explicit efforts those states made 
to control coffee prices in 1905–1914 and 1923–1928. Yet, when we 
exclude rubber states in Specification 4 of Table 5, the coefficient of 
our estimated export tax revenues per capita loses significance.
 A final concern with our IV setup is that, when prices moved, state 
governments could have changed tax rates in order to smooth export tax 
revenue. In that case, our use of prices as an instrument should lead to 
weak first-stage results. But our strong first-stage results disprove that 
hypotheses and show that changes in taxes, which did take place from 
time to time, were not big enough or timed in such a way as to weaken 
the coefficient that measures the sensitivity of changes in export tax 
revenues to changes in export prices. In fact, the F-test of the first stage 
shows that our instrument is strong in the first stage and, according 
to the Anderson likelihood ratio test, does not seem to be correlated 
with the error term. We do, however, have a weaker instrument in 
specification 4. 
 Interestingly, the coefficients for the variable of interest (export tax 
revenues) in the second stage are larger than our OLS panel coefficient. 
These coefficients in the second stage, however, are close to one 
standard error larger than those of the OLS estimates. This leads 
us to believe there is no significant bias or measurement error driving 
our IV results. One could think that the coefficients could be biased 
upwards because the prices of commodities affect expenditures through 
other channels than export tax revenues, resulting in violation of 
the exclusion restriction. For example, commodity prices could have 
pushed land prices up and thus increased the collection of land taxes 
and, in turn, the expenditures on education. However, in Table 5 
we have controlled for the other tax revenues—including land taxes, 
a tax on industries and professions, and other stamp taxes—in order to 
study the pure effect of export tax revenues on education expenditures.
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Even after including these other sources of funding for the state, 
the coefficient of the elasticity of export tax revenues per capita does 
not change much from what we found in the OLS regressions.  
 One final robustness check has to do with alternative factors that 
could be driving the demand for education and that have not been 
controlled for in our estimates. One obvious hypothesis to explain why 
positive windfalls coming from export taxes were used on education is 
that industrialists pressured governments to provide more education and 
that families themselves demanded more education because skill premia 
increased in states that were more industrialized. Another obvious 
hypothesis is that the rapid increase in European immigration to Brazil 
after 1890 created an increase in demand, either because planters 
(e.g., coffee planters) pushed local governments to offer better public 
education to attract immigrants or simply because the immigrants 
themselves demanded public schools. 
 For us to be concerned about immigration and industrialization 
as drivers of the demand for education, we would have to find positive 
correlations between these variables and education expenditures. 
We actually tested these hypotheses and find no evidence that either 
industrialization or immigration drove the increase in state-level 
education spending. Since there is no panel data for industrialization or 
immigration by state, we use cross-sectional data from the population 
censuses (1890, 1920, and 1940) and industrial censuses (1907, 1920, 
and 1940) and interact variables measuring either industrialization 
or the relative size of the immigrant population with our variable of 
interest (export tax revenue per capita), using panel data and our OLS 
basic specification. In fact, we find a negative correlation between 
education expenditures and the number of immigrants per state in 
1890 and 1920 Similarly, when we interact export tax revenue per 
capita with growth in industrial production between 1907 and 1940, 
the number of industrial firms per state, or the value of industrial 
production in 1907, 1920, and 1940 we find statistically significant, but 
negative coefficients.
 We feel confident about these results for at least two reasons. 
One the one hand, the great majority of the European immigrants who 
went to Brazil were from countries such as Italy, Portugal, and Spain, 
where governments did not spend much on education (Lindert 2004). 
Thus we have no reason to expect that people who did not demand 
more education in Europe demanded it in Brazil. On the other hand, 
the industrialization of Brazil did not depend mainly on technology 
with skill complementarities. For instance, following Claudia Goldin 
and Lawrence F. Katz (1998), we divide the industries for which we 
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have data on technology imports between those that use the technology 
of the first industrial revolution (textile and woodworking machinery) 
and those that use the technology of the second industrial revolution 
(turbines to generate electricity and all sorts of electric equipment); 
the former does not require skilled labor but the latter does. We find that 
the largest increase in machinery imports took place in sectors linked to 
the first industrial revolution, which were labor-intensive and required 
less-skilled workers. Therefore, we should not expect to find that either 
industrialists or families were pushing for more education because it is 
not clear that there were any skill premia in the more industrialized 
states.
 All told, it is not clear that immigration or industrialization increased 
the demand for education. It could be the case that changes in income or 
in societal preferences may have changed the demand, but as we control 
for this only imperfectly in our statistical work, we prefer to leave such 
hypotheses as candidates for future research. 
COLONIAL INSTITUTIONS AND EDUCATION EXPENDITURES 
 In the previous section, we explained how the decentralization of 
fiscal responsibilities created heterogeneity in export tax revenues and 
on expenditures on education. In this section, we examine how colonial 
institutions may have mitigated how much state governments spent 
on education when they had windfall revenues from export taxes. 
For instance, politicians may have spent less on education per capita 
in states with higher initial levels of education or in states in which 
there was more inequality in the distribution of assets such as land 
(Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloff 2009). Alternatively, political 
elites in Brazilian states in which there had been more slaves before 
emancipation might have wanted to restrict education for blacks, as a 
way to have a cheap pool of unskilled labor or as a way to preserve the 
political status quo.
 We, therefore, examine both the direct and interactive effect of 
a set of variables proxying for colonial institutions. Our proxies for 
colonial institutions are (1) variables that measure the main commodity 
produced in a given province during colonial times, (2) the state’s 
slave population as a percentage of its total population in 1819 and in 
1864, (3) distance to the equator (to proxy for climate), (4) mortality 
rates from tropical diseases (using 1910 data), and (5) a dummy for 
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high concentration of land ownership (indicating whether or not the 
percentage of large farms—those over 100 hectares—is above the 
mean).8
 We use three dummies to proxy for colonial commodities. First, we 
have a dummy for good and bad colonial institutions. This variable is 
coded as 0 if the state’s main commodity during colonial times was 
produced using plantation agriculture or some form of coerced labor, 
1 otherwise. We follow Miriam Bruhn and Francisco Gallego (2012) 
in coding states according to an assumption that the production of
certain commodity, such as sugar and mining, led to bad institutions. 
Second, following the work of Naritomi, Soares, and Assunção (2012), 
we include a dummy for sugar, cotton, and mining because some of 
those industries may have left a worse system of political institutions 
that then hindered the expansion of education.9 Third, we control 
separately for the agricultural commodities that relied most intensively 
on slaves during colonial times (and for a good part of the nineteenth 
century), such as sugar and cotton. This is a partial correction to the 
Bruhn and Gallego coding, which excluded cotton from the colonial 
commodities that relied on coerced labor. 
 In Panel A of Table 6, we use random-effects regressions to examine 
the degree to which colonial institutions might explain cross-sectional 
variation in education spending. Specifications 1 through 3 show that, in 
states that used coerced labor for mining and sugar production during 
colonial times, per capita expenditures on education were significantly 
lower than the average between 1889 and 1930. Interestingly, being 
a cotton colony (Specification 4) was not correlated with having lower 
per capita expenditures in the long run, despite the fact that cotton 
states, such as Maranhão, had extremely large slave populations. 
In specifications 5 and 6 of Panel A, we can see that the dummy 
variable that that indicates when that ratio of slaves to population is 
higher than the average is only relevant to explain per capita 
expenditures across states when we measure it in 1864 and not when 
we measure it in colonial times (1819). That is, slavery may generate 
perverse elitist institutions, but it does not have to have begun 
in colonial times to be correlated negatively with expenditures on 
education.
8 The variable of land concentration follows Wegenast (2010, p. 11). 
9 We follow Bruhn and Gallego’s classification of good/bad commodities; see Panel C of G
the Appendix for the coding of this variable. We use Naritomi, Soares, and Assunção (2012) G
to code states as mining states or sugar producers. Their data was at the municipal level, so we 
just generalize their variable in order to code states. 
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TABLE 6
OLS REGRESSIONS TO STUDY THE EFFECT OF COLONIAL INSTITUTIONS ON 
EDUCATION EXPENDITURES AT THE STATE LEVEL  
(random effects)
 
Panel A. Correlations Between Colonial Institutions and Expenditures on Education per Capita
OLS Random Effects Regressions: Dependent Variable is 
Education Expenditures per Capita  
 




























Colonial institutions dummies           





















Observations 285 285 285 285 285 
Number of states 20 20 20 20 20 





















Colonial institutions dummies           

















Observations 285 285 285 285 
Number of states 20 20 20 20 
R2 between 0.76 0.63 0.68 0.63 0.76 
 Other than these variables, we do not find any other significant 
correlations of our dummies for colonial institutions with per capita 
education spending. The dummies for high distance from the equator,
high mortality rates, and high concentration of land ownership are not 
significantly correlated with our dependent variable. For instance, 
specification 7 includes distance to the equator as a control and does not 
yield significant results. Specification 8 includes the 1910 mortality rate 
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TABLE 6 — continued 
 
Panel B. Interaction of Export Tax Revenues per Capita and Colonial Institutions Dummies  
(random effects)
OLS Random Effects Regressions: Dependent Variable is 
Education Expenditures per Capita  
 




























Colonial institutions dummies           

































Observations 285 285 285 285 285 
Number of states 20 20 20 20 20 




     
Log of pop density Y Y Y Y Y 





















Colonial institutions dummies           



























Observations 285 285 285 285  
Number of states 20 20 20 20  




     
Log of pop density Y Y Y Y  
Log of debt per capita Y Y Y Y  
* denote statistical significance at 10 percent. 
** denote statistical significance at 5 percent. 
*** denote statistical significance at 1 percent. 
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TABLE 6 — continued 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Errors clustered are at the state level.  
The sample includes only 18 states once we control for the export crop mix because we exclude 
the landlocked state of Goias and the capital of the country, the port of Rio de Janeiro, which 
had import duties as an additional source of revenue. 
from tropical diseases as a proxy for mortality rates during colonial 
times and its coefficient is also not statistically significant.10
 We take a historical liberty when we include an interaction of export 
tax revenue with a dummy that measures if there was high concentration 
of land ownership in 1920, instead of measuring land concentration 
during colonial times. Wegenast (2010, pp. 115–18) assumes that land 
concentration has been stable since colonial times and even uses the Gini 
coefficient for land concentration in 1950 as an “exogenous” source of 
variation to explain expenditures on education in the twentieth century, 
using a cross-sectional regression. However, including a dummy for high 
concentration of land ownership in our panel setting (coded 1 when the 
percentage of farms with more than 100 hectares is above the mean) does
not yield significant coefficients. 
 Beyond the direct effect of colonial institutions, we are interested 
in the interaction between our proxies for colonial institutions and 
expenditures on education per capita. That is, we want to understand 
how institutions moderated (or amplified) the effects that windfall 
revenues had on education expenditures. In Panel B of Table 6, we 
replicate the random-effects regressions of Panel A, but this time we 
include an interactive term for each of our colonial institutions with our 
main variable of interest (the log of export tax revenue per capita). 
The results we get in these specifications are slightly different from 
what we find in Panel A. The coefficients for the colonial institutions 
dummies lose all significance, with two exceptions. As we can see in 
specifications 4 and 6, the only coefficients that are significant are those 
for the interaction between export tax revenues and the dummies for
cotton colonies and for high slave population in 1864. According to the 
results of those specifications, on average, cotton states or states with 
a high ratio of slaves to population had less than half the expenditures 
on education per capita than the average state. States with large slave 
populations in 1864 were the worst. Elites in those states did not show 
much interest in increasing education funding with their windfall export 
tax revenues. We do not have specific information as to whether 
elites in those states discriminated against blacks when they set up 
10 We use the 1910 mortality rate because there is no data for earlier periods. Also, 
the diffusion of cures for malaria and other tropical diseases only began around 1905, so we 
expect a high correlation between mortality rates in 1910 and 1800. 
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new schools, but we do know that most of the education expenditures in 
those states went to schools in the cities and that blacks rarely attended 
them.  
 Yet, these cross-sectional regressions and the inferences we can 
draw from them have to be interpreted carefully because we are 
not controlling for unobservables that may be driving the variation 
in expenditures. Therefore, in Table 8, we reproduce the same 
specifications of Panel B of Table 6, but adding state-fixed effects. 
Again, in this setting the only significant interactions are those with the 
cotton colony dummy and with the dummy that measures if a state had 
a high ratio of slaves to population in 1864.
 We think that the interactions with the other commodity dummies are 
not yielding any results because there is too much variation in education 
expenditures within states that belong to each of the categories for 
colonial institutions. For instance, when we interact a dummy variable 
for states that produced sugar during colonial times with per 
capita export tax revenues, we do not get a significant coefficient 
(see specification 2 in Table 7). That is, there is wide variation even 
within the states that supposedly produced “bad” commodities during 
colonial times. We find sugar states with very poor records on education 
between 1889 and 1930, such as Pernambuco, which actually lowered 
its per capita spending, and we find states that did much better, such as 
Sergipe, which increased spending by almost 30 percent.  
 The case of states that exported cotton during colonial times 
exemplifies how institutions constrained how much of a state’s windfall 
export tax revenues were put into education. We can see in specification 
4 of Table 7 that a 1 percent increase in export tax revenues per capita 
would not lead to a large increase in education expenditures. This is 
because the net effect of an increase in export tax revenues would need 
to add up the elasticity of export tax revenues alone, which is 0.37, 
and the interaction with the cotton state dummy, which is –0.34. In fact, 
cotton had a large, positive price spike in the early 1920s, but that 
was not translated into greater spending on education in Maranhão, 
Piauí and Rio Grande do Norte, the main cotton states. Those states, 
toward the end of the colonial period, used slaves intensively to 
cultivate cotton and had some of the most extractive colonial systems 
in Brazil. In Maranhão, for instance, slaves represented 80 percent 
of the population during colonial times. This state was developed 
from a small outpost into one of the largest entrepôts of Brazil when 
the Portuguese Crown created the Companhia Geral do Comércio do 
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TABLE 7
EXPENDITURES ON EDUCATION INTERACTED WITH COLONIAL INSTITUTIONS 
(Fixed-effects OLS)







































Additional controls:     
Pop. density and debt per capita Y Y Y Y 
Year and state dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 255 255 255 255 
Number of states 18 18 18 18 
R2 overall 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.002 
R2 within 0.370 0.371 0.370 0.410 
Dummy for 
High Percent 






of Slaves to 
Population   
in 1864
(6) 

























Pop. density and debt per capita Y Y Y 
Year and state dummies Y Y Y 
Constant Y Y Y 
Observations 255 255 255 
Number of states 18 18 18 
R2 overall 0.001 0.003 0.000 
R2 within 0.380 0.398 0.411 
* denote statistical significance at 10 percent. 
** denote statistical significance at 5 percent. 
*** denote statistical significance at 1 percent. 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Grão Pará e Maranhão (1755) with the explicit aim of importing 
African slaves to aid in the production of sugar and, later, of cotton 
(Silva 1984, p. 265). 
To avoid inferring too much from commodity dummies, in 
specifications 5 and 6 of Table 7 we add an interaction with the ratio of 
slaves to population in each state in 1819—right before independence—
and in 1864—almost 25 years before the abolition of slavery in 1888. 
Interestingly, we do not get any significant effect when we interact 
export tax revenue with the dummy that measures if there was a high 
ratio of slaves to population in 1819, but we do get a large and 
significant (at 10 percent) coefficient when we use the 1864 ratio. 
Again, this coefficient shows how institutions may constrain the 
diffusion of education. In states with an above-the-mean proportion of 
slaves in 1864, a positive trade shock would not be translated into more 
education spending at all because the coefficient of the interaction is 
larger than the elasticity of export tax revenues. This means that there is 
something about the intensity with which slavery prevailed in a state 
which later led to lower education spending.
 At least two hypotheses can explain the correlation of slavery with 
lower education spending in our regressions in Table 7. First, it could be 
that pure racism led the elites, who were mostly white, to spend less on 
education. In fact, as we show in Table 3, cohort data from 1960 shows 
that the expansion of education we document in this article benefited 
mostly whites. Second, it could be that the states in which slavery 
prevailed had a more unequal distribution of economic assets and 
political power and therefore the elites preferred not to expand public 
education because it could expand the voting population and, thus, 
disrupt the political status quo. In Pernambuco, a sugar state with a 
large slave population, governments actually decreased their spending 
on education during our period of study and the Monarchists stayed in 
power despite the rise of Republican parties throughout Brazil.
 Additionally, we examined if the interaction of export tax revenue 
with the dummies that capture high distance to the equator, high 
mortality rates in 1910, and high concentration of land were correlated
with expenditures on education and we did not find any significant 
coefficient (not reported on Table 7 for space considerations). Perhaps 
those variables are not the ones that create differences between states 
over time, or perhaps their effects are correlated with the crops those 
states produced and, thus, with export tax revenues per capita.
 Finally, in specification 7 of Table 7, we include an interaction with 
the ratio of voters to population in 1875, 15 years before our period 
begins. We can see that in states with a higher percentage of voters
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in 1875, positive trade shocks are barely translated into higher spending 
on education. This could be counterintuitive if we agree with Peter H. 
Lindert that the percentage of voters in the population should be 
correlated with per capita spending on education (Lindert 2004, pp. 33–
43). Yet, there are two explanations of why the results point in the 
opposite direction (i.e., more voters correlated with less education 
spending). First, in Brazil, there was an income requirement to vote 
until 1881. Since states with slaves were richer they also had more 
voters. Second, as we explain before, during the Republican years 
state parties had an incentive to invest in education to increase the 
number of voters they could mobilize for national presidential elections. 
States that started with a larger number of voters, thus, did not have to 
rush to educate future voters.
 Therefore, it seems that if commodities can help us proxy for 
institutions, what matters is not what commodities a state exported 
during colonial times, but the economic system used to produce those 
commodities and the institutions that system left in place in the 
nineteenth century. This is the point that Engerman and Sokoloff made 
in their work and others have now simplified using dummies for 
commodities produced during colonial times.  
 Brazil and other New World colonies were under colonial rule 
for over 300 years, so it is unreasonable to expect simple commodity 
dummies or dummies to capture the intensity of slavery in one year will 
reflect a country or region’s institutional dynamics since colonial times. 
Take for instance the ratio of slaves to population at the end of colonial 
times (in 1809). In São Paulo, Amazonas, Pará, and Minas Gerais, 
slaves made up over 25 percent of the population in 1819, yet these 
states were top spenders on education during our period of 1889–1930. 
In states such as Rio Grande do Norte and Piauí, slaves made up 
less than 15 percent of population in 1819, yet these states spent very 
little on education during our period (see Table 2). In contrast, states 
that ended up with more slaves before abolition, such as Sergipe, 
Pernambuco, and Bahia, ended up spending less on education during 
the Republican period. That is, it was not so much the specific colonial 
institutions that mattered, but how they were preserved or recreated in 
the nineteenth century that drove different states to spend more or less 
on education. 
 In sum, our empirical strategy shows that state governments collected 
more tax revenue when the prices of their export commodities went up. 
Those states that had higher export tax revenues and comparatively 
fewer slaves before abolition ended up spending more on education. 
We would expect those states to also end up having better education 
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outcomes, such as higher literacy and enrollment rates or more schools. 
Below, we use reduced-form estimates to test that expectation. 
EXPORT TAX REVENUES AND EDUCATION OUTCOMES 
 In this section, we argue that the variation in export tax revenues 
not only explains the variation in education spending, but that those 
expenditures were also translated into changes in education outcomes. 
We show the connection between revenue shocks and education 
outcomes using data from the Education Census of 1872, 1890, 
1900, 1920, and 1940 (see the Appendix for sources). We take two 
approaches. First, in Table 8, we use the average of our variables to run 
a simple cross-sectional regression (with a limited sample size of 20) 
to see if average per capita education spending is correlated with the 
literacy rate (1890–1940), the number of schools (1890–1940), and the 
number of students (1890–1940). We find significant correlations for 
the first two. The correlation with number of students is only significant 
when we control for state characteristics.  
 Second, in Table 9, we run a similar regression using panel data. 
We use export prices—the most exogenous component of export tax 
revenue—as our independent variable. We get consistent significant 
results showing that positive price shocks led to improvements 
in education outcomes (with the exception that the correlation with 
enrollment is not significant when we control for population density). 
CONCLUSION 
 We have shown that there was progress in the provision of elementary 
education in Brazil between 1889 and 1930 and that it was largely a 
consequence of the decentralization of revenues and expenditures in this 
period. Thanks to the decentralization of fiscal resources states that 
could get more taxes from commodity exports were able to spend more 
on public education. In those states, education outcomes improved more 
rapidly. 
 We see at least two ways in which our findings are original and 
surprising for a broad literature that studies the political economy 
of development. First, the literature defending the persistent effect of 
colonial institutions seldom discusses in depth the kind of shocks that 
can change the development trajectory of a country or state. We show 
that institutional changes, such as fiscal decentralization, actually matter 
to determine major changes in the development path of states. More 
specifically, we show that the effect of rapid increases in revenues, due to
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TABLE 8
CONDITIONAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EXPENDITURES AND EDUCATION OUTCOMES 
(Cross-section regressions - we display only the coefficients of interest)













Coefficient avg. expenditure pc  
education 
6.412*** 0.815 0.041* 
Coefficient avg. expenditure pc  
education 
6.608*** 1.011*** 0.032 
Coefficient avg. expenditure pc  
education 
6.627*** 1.011*** 0.032 
Coefficient avg. expenditure pc 












Coefficient avg. expenditure pc  
education Y    
Coefficient avg. expenditure pc  
education   Y   
Coefficient avg. expenditure pc  
education   Y Y  
Coefficient avg. expenditure pc 
education   Y Y Y 
* indicates significant at 10 percent. 
** indicates significant at 5 percent.  
*** indicates significant at 1 percent. 
Note: Robust errors are in parenthesis.  
commodity booms, did not lead to increases in education expenditures 
across the board but that such windfall revenues were only translated into 
education spending in states that had egalitarian institutions.  
 Second, we show that major increases in tax revenues can have 
long-lasting effects on human capital accumulation and their distribution 
across states. For instance, we show that the ranking of Brazilian states 
according to literacy rates changed significantly between 1872 and 1930, 
but that it has not changed much since then. This is partly because 
the post-1930 industrialization and the massive internal migration of 
the second half of the twentieth century reinforced the ranking of states 
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TABLE 9 
OLS REGRESSIONS: TRADE SHOCKS AND EDUCATION OUTCOMES 
(Reduced Form - we display only the coefficients of interest)




Rate) Log (schools) 
Log (Enrollment 
Rate)  
Coefficient of Log(state export  
price index) 0.207** 0.647*** 0.329***  
Coefficient of Log(state export  
price index) 0.340*** 0.576*** 0.340***  
Coefficient of Log(state export 
price index) 0.278*** 0.214** 0.272***  
Coefficient of Log(state export 






FE, Macro,  
Year Dummies 
Coefficient of Log(state export  
price index) Y    
Coefficient of Log(state export  
price index)   Y   
Coefficient of Log(state export 
price index)   Y Y  
Coefficient of Log(state export 
price index)   Y Y Y 
* indicates significant at 10 percent. 
** indicates significant at 5 percent. 
*** indicates significant at 1 percent. 
Notes: Dependent variables are education outcomes. The independent variable of interest is 
logarithm of our state price indices for three periods. Panel data using three education census 
years: 1890, 1900, and 1920. In this reduced form, we test the hypothesis that favorable 
fluctuations in the international price of commodities increased the expenditure on schooling, 
which was reflected in higher education outcomes. The expected sign of the coefficient is 
positive. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Errors are clustered at the state level. 
observed in 1930. That is, the initial push in some of the richer states 
generated increasing returns, such that states that were the most 
educated by 1930 became Brazil’s most educated and industrialized 
states at the turn of the twenty-first century. Thus, our article suggests 
one explanation of the origin of Brazil’s severe regional inequality. 
 Now, despite the progress in education during the First Republic 
in Brazil, we are cautious because improvements in education did 
not translate into a broad improvement in human capital accumulation 
for the masses. Additionally, even if commodity booms generated 
windfall revenues that Brazilian state governments spent on education,
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the money was mostly spent on educating whites and mixed-race 
Brazilians. Former slaves and blacks in general did not benefit much 
from the expansion of public education between 1889 and 1930.  
 
Appendix: Data Sources 
APPENDIX TABLE 1 
VARIABLES USED AND THEIR SOURCES 






























Literacy rate X X X X X
1872, 1890, 1900,  
and 1920 from Brazil 
(1923); 1940 from  
Brazil (1950) 
Population, age brackets, 
and data on foreign 
population 
X X X  X  X  
1872, 1890, 1900,  
and 1920 from Brazil 
(1923); 1940 from  
Brazil (1950) 
Number of primary  
Schools X X X X X Both
For 1872, from Brazil 
(1917a); 1907 from 
(1917b); 1920 from 
Brazil (1923); 1933  
from Brazil (1936)  
and 1940 from  
Brazil (1946) 
Enrollment in primary 
schools  X X X X X Both
For 1872 from Brazil 
(1940); 1907 from 
(1917b); 1920 from 
Brazil (1923); 1933  
from Brazil (1936)  
and 1940 from  
Brazil (1946) 
Primary schools teachers 
   
X X X Both
1907 from (1917b);  
1920 from Brazil (1923);
1933 from Brazil (1936) 
and 1940 from  
Brazil (1946) 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 — continued 
Panel B. Fiscal and Trade Data Variable
 Source: 
Education expenditure and  
export tax revenue11
Willeman (1909) and Brazil (1926), data for the 1880s from  
Brazil (1887) 
State public revenue12 For data before 1897, we use Brazil (1914). For data from 1897  to 1939, see AEB V (1939/40).  
Commodity prices  Global Financial Data and Jacks, O’Rourke, and Williamson (2009). 
Exports and imports Data from 1902 (imports) and 1901 and 1902 (exports) from  
Brazil (1904); 1908–1912 comes from Brazil (1917a); Data from  
1913–1927 and 1935–1940 comes from Commerico Exterior do  
Brasil, several years; Information from 1928–1934 is from  
Brazil (1938); Data for 1887, 1892 to 1897 and 1903–1907 is  
from Brazil (1908). Except for Minas Gerais13 and the Federal District  
(Distrito Federal).14 Data for Minas Gerais from Minas Gerais (1929). 
13 We only have state expenditures in schooling for the periods 1901–1907, 1914–1916, 1919–
1921, and 1924–1926. Expenditures come from the state budgets and may differ from the actual 
amounts spent. 
14 The data is the budgeted and not the “actual” amounts spent. The data sources we have reported 
budgets for either 6 or 18 months, thus we had to annualize the amounts, multiplying by 2 or 2/3, 
respectively. Finally, we completed some missing data using simple linear interpolation between the 
closest data points available. 
13 We have information only for states that had customs offices and a port (or a navigable river that 
connected it to the ocean). For this reason, we originally had no data for Góias (GO) and Minas 
Gerais (MG). Yet for Minas Gerais, we have some reports of total exports, but not the ports from 
which they were shipped. We know that most exports were shipped from Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Santos 
(in São Paulo, SP), and, in the 1920s, Espírito Santo (ES). For simplicity, we assume that the exports 
of MG were exported through RJ and SP in equal proportions. We therefore subtract the exports from 
MG from those of those two other states. For the MG export data for 1927–1931, we assume that the 
MG average export share between 1923 and 1927 will prevail for the rest of the studied period and 
we proceed with the same methodology as explained above. We also estimate using the exports as 
reported by the federal publications (excluding MG); the results do not change. Unfortunately, data 
for imports for MG are not available. Therefore, all the estimations that include imports as a control 
exclude the observations from MG. 
14 The city of Rio de Janeiro was the capital of Brazil, known as the Federal District (Distrito 
Federal or DF). Rio de Janeiro City is in the middle of what was Rio de Janeiro State, now 
Guanabara. Both the city and the state collected their own tax revenue, yet export taxes collected in 
the port of Rio de Janeiro accrued mostly to the State of Rio de Janeiro, while import taxes accrued to 
the federal government, as in other parts of the country. Moreover, the port of Rio de Janeiro, in the
Federal District, served the states of Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais. Rio de Janeiro state had no 
other port until it added Angra dos Reis in the 1920s. Therefore, we cannot distinguish the exports 
made from the capital itself and from Rio de Janeiro State (or from Minas Gerais; see note above). 
We are confident, however, that most of the exports shipped from the port of Rio de Janeiro were 
commodities produced in the state of Rio de Janeiro and not in the Federal District. Furthermore, we 
consider that the state of Rio de Janeiro benefited from the exports and economic activity of the port 
of the city of Rio de Janeiro and vice versa and, for this reason, we use the same level of international 
trade activity for both state and city.  
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 — continued 
 
Panel C. Data Sources for Variables That Measure Institutions, Industrialization, and Electoral 
Participation 
Variable Definition Source: 
Dummy good commodity 1 if the state grew a “good” 
commodity; 0 otherwise. Good 
commodities include cacao, cattle,  
and cotton; bad commodities include 
mining, sugar, and the trade of 
enslaved Indians. We use Bruhn and 
Gallego’s coding, but add Ceará and 
Piauí as cotton and sugar states, 
respectively. Thus we code states  
as follows: AL=Sugar, AM=Cacao; 
BA=Sugar; CE=Cotton; ES=Sugar; 
GO=Mining; MA=Cotton; 
MG=Mining; MT=Cattle; 
PA=Cacao; PB=Sugar; PE=Sugar; 
PI=Sugar; PR=Mining; RJ=Sugar; 
RN=Cattle; RS=Cattle; SC=Cattle; 
SE=Sugar; SP=Indians. 
Bruhn and Gallego (2007) 
Industrial production and number  
of industrial establishments  
Industrial production in 1920  
milreís and number of industrial 
establishments. 
1907, 1920, and 1940 
Industrial Census 
Population density Population/km2 For population, see Panel A; 
for state areas, see Wileman 
(1909) 
Precolonial native population Population per km2at the time of 
colonization. 
Bruhn and Gallego (2007) 
Size of rural establishments  
in 1920  
Average number of hectares per  
rural establishment in 1920. 
1920 Industrial Census 
Slave population Slave population in 1819 and 1864.  
We divide them by the population  
of each state in 1823 and 1872, 
respectively. 
Stein, Vassouras, p. 295  
and 1872 Population  
Census 
Voters in 1875, 1910, and 1934 Before 1891 we only have the 
number of registered voters, not  
the number of people who actually 
casted a vote.  
Between 1891 and 1934 we have 
data for the number of registered 
voters (eleitores) and the number  
of actual votes. 
Brazil (1913) and  
ipeadata.com 
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